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I. INTRODUCTION
The surprise and drama of President Carter's recognition of the
People's Republic of China as "the sole legal government of
* Member of the District of Columbia and Georgia Bars.

512

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 12:511

China"' have overshadowed the unique legal concepts on which his
policy rests. Those concepts impact directly on private trade and
investment transactions with Taiwan. They may also sound the
death knell for traditional definitions of the term "recognition" in
international law and diplomacy.
The recognition of a government such as the People's Republic
of China (and the related termination of recognition of the Republic of China government) is a unique hybrid: a political act of the
executive branch which directly affects the application of legal
principles by the judicial branch. In the present instance the President sought, by executive directives and the introduction of legislation in Congress, to separate the political act from its traditional
legal consequences. The resulting Taiwan Relations Act of 1979,2
amounts to legislative re-recognition of the Republic of China government on Taiwan.
This article examines the domestic legal consequences of the
international law concept of recognition, and the relevance of that
concept in current diplomatic practice. It will also consider the
effect of the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which restored legislatively the legal incidents normally flowing only from the executive
act of recognition.
1. Joint Communique on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between
the United States of America and the People's Republic of China, January 1,
1979, 14 WEEKLY CoMP. OF PREs. Doc. 2264 (December 18, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as P.R.C.-U.S. Joint Communique]. The Communique, which President Carter
read during his television address to the nation on December 15, 1978, states in
part:
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China have
agreed to recognize each other and to establish diplomatic relations as of
January 1, 1979.
The United States of America recognizes the Government of the People's
Republic of China as the sole legal Government of China. Within this context, the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial,
and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan.
The United States of America and the People's Republic of China reaffirm the principles agreed on by the two sides in the Shanghai Communique
and emphasize once again that:***
- The Government of the United States of America acknowledges
the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part
of China.
For a recounting of the events leading up to the Joint Communique, see D.
Scheffer, The Law of Treaty Termination as Applied to the United States DeRecognition of the Republic of China, 19 HAuv. NT'L L.J. 931, 937-44 (1978).
2. Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (1979) (to be codified at 22 U.S.C. § 3301).
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TRADITIONAL LEGAL CONSEQUENCES OF DERECOGNITION

International law generally acknowledges that the determination of which government is to be recognized as representative of
a foreign state is a political question lying within the discretion of
each individual state.' Regardless of any objective set of facts
which might exist, such as the foreign government's actual military and political control of all of the territory of the foreign state,
a state has no legal obligation to recognize any government's claim
to represent a foreign state.4 In the United States the President has
the exclusive power to recognize foreign governments and establish
diplomatic relations without consultation with other branches of
government. That power flows from article II, section 3 of the
United States Constitution, which provides that the President
"shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers."5
While deferring to the executive branch for the determination of
which government is to be recognized as representative of a foreign
state, United States courts have as a formal matter reserved for
themselves the right to determine the legal consequences of that
recognition. This distinction was stated by the United States Supreme Court in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v.United States:
What government is to be regarded here as representative of a
foreign sovereign state is a political rather than a judicial question,
and is to be determined by the political department of the government. Objections to its determination as well as to the underlying
policy are to be addressed to it and not to the courts. Its action in
recognizing a foreign government and in receiving its diplomatic
representatives is conclusive on all domestic courts, which are
bound to accept that determination, although they are free to draw
for themselves its legal consequences in litigations pending before
them.'

In practice, the absence of United States recognition of a government has traditionally had significant adverse legal consequences
under domestic law, despite the courts' reserved right to decide

3.

See 1 O'CoNNEL, INTERNATIONAL LAw 135 (2d ed. 1970).

4.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES §

99 (1965).

5. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 3. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVIcE, LmRARY OF
CONGRESS, THE CONSTrrUTON OF THE UNrrED STATES OF AMERIcA 541 (1973 ed.).
6.

Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137-38

(1938).
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independently the nature and extent of such consequences. Some
of the more significant consequences deserve discussion.
A.

Property Rights

An unrecognized government may not exercise ownership rights
in property owned by the State and located outside the territory
under its effective control.' The courts have held that property of
the state located outside the territory remains subject to control
of the recognized government even when no part of the territory
remains under its control.
B. Effect of Laws
Courts generally have not accepted the laws of an unrecognized
government as a basis for establishing rights and resolving disputes
among parties located outside the territory under its effective control even though such laws would otherwise be applicable under
generally accepted choice-of-law or conflict-of-law principles. The
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the District Courts of that circuit
and the New York courts have been the forums most frequently
faced with deciding the- effect to be given the laws of nonrecognized governments. The cases have arisen primarily as a result of the protracted periods of United States non-recognition of
the Soviet government and its Eastern European regimes. In many
cases, the decisions seem tempered by the particular degree of
controversy prevailing in United States-Soviet relations at the
time and are not analytically consistent in all respects. The American Law Institute, however, offers a useful formulation of the general legal principle which emerges from the cases:
A court in the United States will give the law of an unrecognized
entity or regime which satisfies the requirements for recognition
... the effect which it would have under the rules of conflict of laws
if the entity or regime were recognized, to the extent only that such
law relates to:
(a) matters of an essentially private nature within the
effective control of the unrecognized entity or regime or
(b) the transfer of property localized at the time of the
transfer in the territory of the unrecognized entity or regime
and belonging then to a national thereof.8
7.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATONs LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES §

107, Comment c (1965).
8. Id. § 113.
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Chief Judge Cardozo, in Petrogradsky Mejdemarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank of New York, explained the
courts' rationale succinctly, stating, "The decrees of the Soviet
Republic nationalizing the Russian banks are not law in the United
States, nor recognized as law. .

.

. They are exhibitions of power.

They are not pronouncement of authority." 9 Courts, however, do
not deny the effect of laws of an unrecognized government in regulating "the everyday transactions of business or domestic life"
within the territory controlled by the non-recognized government.10
In that situation a different test is advanced, which may result in
application of laws of the non-recognized government.
The question with us is whether, within Russia, the Soviet decrees
have actually attained such effect as to alter the rights and obligations of parties in a manner we may not in justice disregard, even
though they do not emanate from a lawfully established authority,
recognized politically by the government of the United States."
Some of the cases that refused to enforce particular laws of unrecognized governments have suggested in dicta that a different result might have been reached if the particular laws there in question, generally laws of expropriation, had not been the subject of
specific criticism by the executive branch. One court noted in an
aside that:
[W]e do not have before us a mere failure to recognize in the
absence of a strong executive policy against condoning in any way
the Soviet occupation of Latvia. It might well be that in the absence
of such a policy the usual rules applicable under the established
doctrines of conflicts of laws would apply.2
The result in some cases may also be affected by the fact that a
different holding would have placed additional resources in the
control of "the very government not recognized as existent.' 3
9. Petrogradsky Mejdemarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank
of New York, 253 N.Y. 23, 28, 170 N.E. 479, 481 (1930).
10. Id. at 28-29, 170 N.E. at 481.
11. M. Salinoff & Co. v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 262 N.Y. 220, 225,
186 N.E. 679, 681 (1933).
12. Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000,
1002 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
13. Petrogradsky Mejdemarodny Kommerchesky Bank v. National City Bank
of New York, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479, 481 (Ct. App. 1930).
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C. Judicial Decisions
Decisions by courts of an unrecognized government do not appear to be given any greater effect than acts by other branches of
such a government. On several occasions, United States courts
have held that courts established by an unrecognized government
are incapable of issuing effective process over residents of the territory controlled by that government.'4
D.

Court Appearances

An unrecognized government has not been permitted to appear
as a litigant before United States courts. The Supreme Court
states in Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States that:
[T]he principle controlling here and recognized by the courts of
New York [is] that the rights of a sovereign state are vested in the
state rather than in any particular government which may purport
to represent it. . . and that suit in its behalf may be maintained
in our courts only by that government which has been recognized
by the political department of our own government as the authorized government of the foreign state."
Some very narrow distinctions, however, have been drawn by some
courts between governmental and non-governmental entities. In
Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 1 a deposit
of the Bank of China in a United States bank was claimed by rival
managements sponsored by the recognized Republic of China government and the unrecognized government of the People's Republic of China. The Court, before deciding that award of the funds
to either claimant would be premature, noted that "The funds here
in controversy belong to a Chinese corporation, which has weathered previous governmental upheavals. Although by virtue of majority stock ownership, the Government of China controls this corporation, it is not a public corporation nor are its funds govern7 -Following the same logic, the court in Walter Upment funds."M
right v. Mercury Business Machines Company, Inc. permitted the
plaintiff corporation, a seller of business machines, to recover on a

14. See The Signe, 37 F. Supp. 819, 821 (E.D. La. 1941); The Regent, 35 F.
Supp. 985, 986 (E.D.N.Y. 1940).
15. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137

(1938).
16. 92 F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950).
17. Id. at 923.
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trade acceptance even though the plaintiff was alleged to be "an
arm and instrumentality of such unrecognized East German Government."' 18 By contrast, the court in The Maret ignored the separate existence of the nominal claimant, the Estonian State Steamship Line, and concluded that "an unrecognized sovereign itself,
the Soviet Republic of Estonia, is the actual party in interest
...
[A] fortiori it may not be heard to assert a claim based
upon ownership of the Maret." 9
E. Statutory Interpretation
Numerous United States governmental trade measures are of
uncertain applicability in respect of the territory controlled by
unrecognized governments. Under the Trade Act of 1974, which
implements the Generalized System of Preferences, a country may
be designated as a beneficiary developing country eligible for duty2
free treatment on certain articles exported to the United States. 1
The term "country" as used in the statute includes both the state
and government without distinction. Similarly, the Arms Export
Control Act permits sale of weapons, defensive aircraft and other
military equipment only to "friendly countries." 2' The absence of
recognition tends to cast in doubt the availability of the benefits
of these and similar statutes.
In addition to the foregoing, the particular circumstances of the
derecognition of Taiwan raised questions concerning the applicability of certain other United States statutes which apply sanctions
in respect of countries with which the United States has
"terminated" or "severed" diplomatic relations. The Foreign Assistance Act, for example, provides that "[n]o assistance shall be
furnished under this chapter or any other Act . . . in or to any
country. . . with which the United States has severed or hereafter
"22
severs diplomatic relations ....

III. PoLmIcAL BASIS OF REcOGNITION POLICY
The hostility which United States courts have displayed toward
the interests of unrecognized governments stems from the concep18. Upright v. Mercury Business Machines Co., Inc., 13 A.D.2d 36, 39, 213
N.Y.S.2d 417, 421 (1961).

19. The Maret, 145 F.2d 431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944).
20.

19 U.S.C. §§ 2461-65 (1976).

21.
22.

22 U.S.C. §§ 2751, 2754 (1976).
22 U.S.C. § 2370(t) (1976).
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tion that the executive branch establishes national policy goals
when it withholds recognition from a government.2 3 The courts
deem their own actions to be in furtherance of those goals.24 Since
recognition-with its implied cachet of accepted legitimacy-has
frequently been used by states, including the United States, to
communicate their approval or disapproval of the manner in which
a change in government has been effected,2 the position taken by
the courts is founded on an obvious logic. It does not, however,
comport with the shifting realities of diplomacy.
The policy of the United States in recognizing new governments
has changed frequently. The changes have reflected the relative
world power position of the United States at various points in its
history, although generally couched in quite different rhetoric. In
its infancy the United States generally based recognition upon the
declaratory or de facto doctrine, which holds that recognition is in
order if as a matter of fact the government in question exists as the
ruling power in control of the country. 0 In 1868 with the nation's
Civil War behind it, Secretary of State Seward advanced a
"republican" test: "The policy of the United States is settled upon
the principle that revolutions in republican States ought not to be
accepted until the people have adopted them by organic law, with
the solemnities which would seem sufficient to guarantee their
stability and permanency. 21 7 The post-World War II rationale of
the United States combined national self-interest with an examination of whether the government in question fulfilled its
"international obligations" as defined by the United States. This
confluence of ideas was expressed by Secretary of State Dulles in
reference to the People's Republic of China government:
23. "Non-recognition of a foreign sovereign and non-recognition of its decrees
are to be as essential a part of the power confided by the Constitution to the
Executive for the conduct of foreign affairs as recognition." The Maret, 145 F.2d
431, 442 (3d Cir. 1944).
24. "[W]hen the executive branch of the Government has determined upon
a foreign policy, which can be and is ascertained, and the non-recognition of
specific foreign decrees is deliberate and is shown to be part of that policy, such
non-recognition must be given effect by the courts." Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
25. See generally T. CHEN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF RECOGNITION 105-116
(1951).
26. Id. p. 117.
27. 1 C. HYDE,INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES

162 n.8 (2d rev. ed. 1947).
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Internationally the Chinese Communist regime does not conform to
the practices of civilized nations; does not live up to its international
obligations; has not been peaceful in the past and gives no evidence
of being peaceful in the future. Its foreign policies are hostile to us
and our Asian allies. Under these circumstances it would be folly for
us to establish relations with the Chinese Communists which would
enhance their ability to hurt us and our friends.2
Another statement by Secretary Dulles was perhaps the most candid explanation of United States policy: "[W]e accord
[recognition] when we think it will fit in with our national inter-

est, and if it doesn't, we don't accord

it.

''

29

More recently, two important changes have taken place which
undermine use of recognition as an emblem serving to inform the
courts as to national policy goals of the Executive Branch. First,
in accord with the changing balances in world power, the United
States is returning to the declaratory policy of recognition, which
it utilized as an infant nation, a policy which divorces recognition
from legal or moral judgment. Deputy Secretary of State Warren
Christopher has expressed this latest change as follows:
the premise of our present policy is that diplomatic relations do not
constitute a seal of approval .... [T]he reality is that, in this day
and age, coups and other unscheduled changes of government are
not exceptional developments. Withholding diplomatic relations
from these regimes, after they have obtained effective control, penalizes us. It means that we forsake much of the chance to influence
the attitudes and conduct of a new regime. Without relations, we
forfeit opportunities to transmit our values and communicate our
policies. Isolation may well bring out the worst in the new government. 0
The second and most important change in United States recognition policy has been a gradual but firm movement away from
defining relations with newly formed governments in terms of recognition, non-recognition or derecognition.3 1 In the political arena,
28. Address by Secretary of State Dulles, Lions International Convention
(June 25, 1957), reprinted in 37 DEP'T STATE BuLL. at 94-95 (1957).
29. Secretary of State Dulles, News Conference (March 13, 1957), reprinted
in 36 DEP'T STATE BuLL. at 536 (1957).
30. Address by Secretary of State Christopher (June 11, 1977) quoted in Baxter, Foreword to L. GALLOWAY, RECOGNIZING FOREIGN GOVERNMENTs-THE PRACTICE OF TH UNITED STATES at ix-x (1978).
31. Baxter, Foreword to L. GALLOWAY, supra note 30 at ix.
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there is little that the unrecognized government has not been able
to achieve in its relations with other recognized and unrecognized
governments. Non-recognition does not preclude membership and
participation in global or regional organizations. It does not prevent the negotiation and execution of treaties with non-recognizing
governments. Non-recognition generally does little to interfere
with the normal intercourse of states." Professor D. P. O'Connell
notes that "It is possible for a government to have almost normal
intercourse with another and yet not recognize it, allowing only
the consequences of its intercourse and excluding the other consequences which would flow from recognition." 3 The relationship
of the United States and the People's Republic of China prior to
the recognition announcement in December 1978 illustrates this
point. Without recognizing each other the United States government and the People's Republic of China government had many
contacts: they served together as members of international organizations; 34 both agreed to the text of joint communiques;" they
exchanged visits of political leaders;" they exchanged diplomatic
representations through the establishment of liaison offices in
each other's capital and became co-signers of multilateral treaties.37 For all the tradition and custom that surround the concept
of recognition in international law, it may now simply be, as one
commentator has observed, that it "has little substantive content."
Political development in the field of governmental recognition
has not yet, however, been matched by judicial perception that in
the current world of non-recognition may reflect a variety of pres32. The phenomenon of dealing directly with unrecognized governments is
sometimes described as recognition of the de facto existence of a government or
as "de facto recognition." The latter formulation, however, confusingly focuses
on the legal status of the act of recognition rather than, more properly, on the
accepted legal status of the government in question. 2 M. WHrrEN, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3-4 (1963).
33. 1 O'CoNNELL, supra note 3 at 153.
34. United Nations Security Council Restoration of the Lawful Rights of the
People's Republic of China in the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2758, 26 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 29) 2, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971).
35. E.g., P.R.C.-U.S. Joint Communique, supra note 1; Shanghai Joint Communique, February 27, 1972, 8 WEEKLY Comp. OF PRES. Doc. 473 (1972).
36. Frankel, A Quiet Greeting, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1972, at 1, col. 8 (Presi-

dent Nixon's 1972 visit to Peking).
37. E.g., Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat.
1180, T.I.A.S. 1591, 15 U.N.T.S. 295.
38. Schwebel, Is the Recognition of Governments Obsolete? Washington Post,
Feb. 23, 1972, at 16, col. 3.
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sures and relationships which do not necessarily include a national
policy of animosity toward the unrecognized government. 9 Accordingly, President Carter's terminating recognition of the Republic
of China as the government of China created the problem that his
action -would likely produce the unacceptable domestic legal results described above. Although the special circumstances surrounding the Taiwan situation might have led the courts to r&,
examine the prevailing judicial attitudes towards non-recognition,
one could not reasonably have expected prudent businessmen to
maintain normal commercial relations with Taiwan on the speculation that courts would not follow the principles established in
prior decisions. President Carter sensibly opted for a legislative
solution, submitting to Congress a proposed bill 0 which would
have extended to Taiwan a limited number of the legal attributes
41
of a recognized government.

IV.

DIPLoMATIc STATUS OF TAwAN

The ROC government is the successor to the revolutionary government of China begun in 1912 under Dr. Sun Yat-Sen following
the overthrow of the Manchu dynasty. The ROC government fled
to the offshore island of Taiwan in December 1949 and since that
time has controlled no mainland territory. The People's Republic
of China government ("PRC"), formed under the leadership of
39. Conversely, recognition should perhaps be less automatically accepted as
a cachet of national approbation in light of the executive branch's current readoption of a declaratory policy of recognition. Some courts have acknowledged
that the withholding of recognition "does not necessarily stamp all of its acts with
disapproval or brand them unworthy of judicial notice. . . . [Executive policy]
is a fact which properly should be weighed along with the other facts before the
court." Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 104 F. Supp. 59
(N.D. Cal. 1952).
40. S. 245; H.R. 2479, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in Hearings on S. 245,
infra note 62 at 3. The bill was substantially revised before final enactment as
the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-8, 93 Stat. 14 (to be codified at
22 U.S.C. § 3301-16 & scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
41. To bridge the gap in time between January 1, 1979, the effective date of
the action recognizing the PRC, and the date on which the Taiwan legislation
would become effective, the President on December 30, 1978, issued a
"Memorandum for All Departments and Agencies" in which he directed the
government to carry out substantially all of the terms of the proposed legislation
prior to its enactment. 44 Fed. Reg. 1075 (1979). No legal basis for the directive
has ever been advanced, although the memorandum begins with a dangling reference to the President's "constitutional responsibility for the conduct of the foreign
relations of the nation."
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Mao Tse-tung in October 1949 and seated in Peking, has controlled
the mainland provinces of China since the flight of the ROC government. Thus, since 1949 the PRC has been the de facto government of the mainland territory and the ROC has been the de facto
government of Taiwan. The United States, however, although
steadfastly retaining its position that the ROC was the de jure
government of all of China, never officially acknowledged that
Taiwan again became a part of China following World War 11.42
In January 1950, President Truman stated that "in keeping with
[the Cairo and Potsdam] declarations, [Taiwan] was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the past four
years, the United States and the other Allied powers have accepted
the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island."" A different
note was sounded upon the outbreak of hostilities in Korea in June
1950. President Truman declared the "neutralization" of the Taiwan Strait and stated that determination of the future status of
Taiwan was to "await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a
peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."" The following year, Secretary of State Dulles observed
that "technical sovereignty over [Taiwan] and the Pescadores has
never been settled" and "the future title is not determined by the
Japanese peace treaty."45
In this context, the Joint Communique of December 15, 1978,
stated that the United States recognized the PRC as "the sole legal
government of China."" The unanswered question is whether the
United States now at last acknowledges Taiwan is part of China.
The Communique itself continues the semantic game earlier
played in the 1972 Shanghai Joint Communique. In the 1972 document the United States "acknowledge [d] that all Chinese on ei42. Historically, Taiwan was an independent, largely tribal area until it was
conquered by forces of the Manchu Chinese Empire in 1683. In 1895 China ceded
Taiwan to Japan by the Treaty of Shimonoseki, bringing the Sino-Japanese War
to a close. ROC forces assumed control of Taiwan upon Japan's World War II
surrender in 1945.
43. Statement by Pres. Truman, White House (Jan. 5, 1950), reprintedin 22
DEP'T STATE BULL. at 79 (1950).
44. Statement by Pres. Truman (June 27, 1950), reprinted in 23 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 5 (1950).
45. CHINA AND THE QUESTION OF TAIWAN, DOCUMENTS AND ANALYSIS 128 (H.
Chiu, ed. 1973). The Japanese peace treaty with the Allies in 1952 did not formally cede Taiwan to China; Japan merely "renounced all right, title and claim
to Taiwan." Id. at 245.
46. P.R.C.-U.S. Joint Communique, supra note 1.
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ther side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and
that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States does not challenge that position."4 The 1978 Communique uses a variation of
the same theme: "The Government of the United States acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan
is part of China."" In acknowledging the "Chinese position" rather
than the fact itself, the President deliberately left ambiguous the
precise legal view which the United States takes concerning the
status of Taiwan. 49 The inherent ambiguity of the word
5

"acknowledge" is accentuated by the context. The ambiguity,
however, extends only to the bare legal issue. On a practical level
the Communique states that "our current commercial, cultural,
trade and other relations with Taiwan" will be maintained
"through non-governmental means," which constitutes acceptance
of the separate existence of Taiwan for a number of significant
purposes.-' The United States objective of continuation of separate
47. Shanghai Joint Communique, supra note 35. For an examination of the
linguistic discrepancy between the English and Chinese terminology used, see Li,
The Law of Non-Recognition: The Case of Taiwan, 1 NORTHWESTERN J. INT'L LAW
AND Bus. 134, 137 n.12 (1979).

48. P.R.C.-U.S. Joint Communique, supra note 1.
49. Recognition of governments must be distinguished from recognition of
states. An interesting question exists whether Taiwan should properly be regarded
as a separate nation state. Statehood is generally found to require an entity that
has a defined territory and population under the control of the government and
that engages in foreign relations. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNrrED STATES § 100 (1965). In a similar vein, the 1933 Convention
on Rights and Duties of States provides in Article (1) that: "The state as a person
of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent
population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into
relations with the other States." Convention on Rights and Duties of States, Dec.
26, 1933, 49 Stat. 3097, T.S. No. 881. In the case of Taiwan, requirements (a),
(c), and (d) are probably satisfied, but requirement (b) (i.e., a defined territory)
occasions some difficulty. If the government of Taiwan simply claimed competence in relation to the territory of Taiwan (including the Pescadores), one might
easily conclude that Taiwan complies with the requirements of statehood in international law, and should therefore be considered as an independent nation state.
The ROC government, however, claims competence over mainland China in
addition to Taiwan. For that reason alone, it might be argued that Taiwan does
not comply with the requirements of statehood because it does not possess a
defined territory.
50. "Acknowledge" may mean "to take notice of" or, more strongly, "to recognize as genuine." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (14th ed.
1961).
51. Subsequent enactment of the Taiwan Relations Act with all its provisions
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relations with Taiwan, however, is inconsistent under traditional
legal principles with the political decision that Taiwan has no
recognized government and that it may indeed be a province of
another recognized state.
V. THE TAIwAN RELATnONs AcT
A.

General Provisions

The Taiwan Relations Act" goes significantly further than the
legislation first proposed by President Carter. It legislatively accords to the ROC all of the legal attributes normally extended to
states and governments through the political act of recognition.
The Act approaches the Taiwan relations question on two levels.
At the private level, the Act provides that "the law of the United
States shall apply with respect to Taiwan in the same manner that
the laws of the United States applied with respect to Taiwan prior
to January 1, 1979," and that "[t]he absence of diplomatic relations or recognition shall not affect the application of the laws of
the United States with respect to Taiwan." 53
At the public level, all inter-governmental relations between the
United States government and its agencies and the ROC government and its agencies are funnelled through two officially designated entities, which the Act euphemistically refers to as
for the continuance of commercial, cultural and other relations between Taiwan
and the United States must at least amount to recognition of the de facto control
of the ROC on Taiwan. Although not determinative of recognition, such provisions clearly lead to the conclusion that the United States recognizes the existence
of some form of international entity with a competent governing authority. While
various provisions in the Act might be cited, the most conclusive provision is
Section 4(b)(i) which provides that "whenever the laws of the United States refer
or relate to foreign countries, nations, states, or similar entities, such terms shall
include and such laws shall apply with respect to Taiwan." 22 U.S.C.A. §
3303(b)(1) (Supp. 1 1979). Section 4(c) provides for the "continuation in force of
all treaties and other international agreements, including multilateral conventions, entered into by the United States and the governing authorities on Taiwan
recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979,
and in force between them on December 31, 1978, unless and until terminated in
accordance with law." Id. § 3303(c). Finally, Section 4(d) provides that "nothing
in this act may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion
of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution
or any international organization." Id. § 3303(d).
52. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3301 et seq. (Supp. 1 1979).
53. Id. § 3303.
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"unofficial instrumentalities."54 The official instrumentality for
the United States is the American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit
5
corporation organized under the laws of the District of Columbia.
The American Institute has two missions. First, it conducts and
carries out "[pirograms, transactions and other relations conducted or carried out by the President or any agency of the United
States Government with respect to Taiwan. . .in the manner and
to the extent directed by the President."56 Thus, the American
Institute will function as an intermediary for the United States
government and its agencies in any activities which would otherwise deal with the ROC government or its agencies. Second, since
the United States will no longer have official diplomatic service
personnel in Taiwan, the American Institute is authorized to perform normal consular functions, including administering oaths,
taking affidavits or depositions, performing notarial acts, and assisting and protecting the interests of United States persons by
performing other consular acts. In this latter role, the American
Institute, headed and staffed by former personnel of the United
States Foreign Service, is successor to the United States embassy
in Taipei and the consulates elsewhere in Taiwan.
The Act also requires that the Taiwan government establish its
own unofficial instrumentality. The ROC government has duly
created the Coordinating Council for North American Affairs58 and
President Carter has determined that the Taiwan Council possesses "the necessary authority . . . to provide assurances and

take other actions on behalf of Taiwan."59 Thus, the President
and United States agencies, within the limits set by the President, are authorized to deal with the Taiwan Council in substantially the same way in which they previously dealt with the ROC
54.

Id. § 3305, 3309.

55. Id. § 3305. The American Institute was incorporated in the District of
Columbia on January 10, 1979. Significantly, the Act in Section 6(c) provides that
its terms preempt any inconsistent terms of the laws of the District of Columbia
or any other State in which the American Institute is doing business. Id. § 3305(c).
Governmental control of the actions of the American Institute is assured by
Section 6(a)(2), which authorizes the President to designate "a comparable successor non-governmental entity." Id. § 3305(a)(2).
56. Id. § 3305(a).
57. Id. § 3306.
58. N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1979, at A4 col. 2.
59. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3309 (Supp. 1 1979). By Exec. Order No. 12,143, 44 Fed.
Reg. 37,191 (June 26, 1979), Pres. Carter determined that the Taiwan Council
conformed to the requirements of the Act.
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government." In addition, the Taiwan Council's central office in
Washington and its eight branch offices throughout the United
States have replaced the ROC embassy and consulates.6 1
Although an exaltation of form over substance, the "unofficial
instrumentality" format promises to be an effective, albeit clumsy,
mechanism for resolving the conflicting diplomatic and economic
interests of the United States. In testimony before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations, Deputy Secretary of State
Christopher has pointed out the successful experience of other
countries which utilized an unofficial alter ego after terminating
diplomatic relations with the ROC and recognizing the PRC. 2
Japan, which changed its diplomatic recognition from the ROC
to the PRC in 1972, is generally credited with pioneering the
approach."
B.

Effects at Governmental Level
1. Treaty Relations

The United States and Taiwan were parties to some 59 bilateral
and multilateral treaties, including the Mutual Defense Treaty of
1954,64 the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, 5 and
the Agreement for Cooperation concerning Civil Uses of Atomic
Energy. 6 The Act approves the continuation of all such agreements "unless and until terminated in accordance with law."67
State Department representatives have testified that President
Carter intends to allow all of the treaties to remain in force except
the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954, which he acted to terminate
60.

22 U.S.C.A. § 3309 (Supp. 1 1979).

61.

Although the Act authorizes the President to extend to the Taiwan Coun-

cil and its personnel on a reciprocal basis "such privileges and immunities...
as may be necessary for the effective performance of their function," Sec. 10(c),
22 U.S.C. 3309, none have been extended to date. It is unlikely that the President
will elect to extend full diplomatic privileges and immunities. The Georgia Senate, however, has adopted a resolution according diplomatic privileges and immunities to personnel of the Taiwan Council office located within its borders. Ga.
S. Res. 194, March 21, 1979.
62. Hearings on S. 245 Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1979).
63. D. Scheffer, supra note 1, at 941 n.33.
64. 6 U.S.T. 433; T.I.A.S. 3178; 248 U.N.T.S. 213.
65. 63 Stat. 1299; T.I.A.S. 1871; 25 U.N.T.S. 69.
66. 23 U.S.T. 945; T.I.A.S. 7364.
67. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303 (Supp. 1 1979).
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effective January 1, 1980.88 On December 13, 1979, the United
States Supreme Court dismissed without oral argument an action
brought by Senator Barry Goldwater and 23 other members of
Congress, 9 which alleged that the President lacked the power to
terminate that treaty without Congressional concurrence. 0
The stability and military security of Taiwan should be unaffected by the outcome of the Goldwater litigation. In fact, the Act
probably offers Taiwan stronger defense assurances than does the
Mutual Defense Treaty itself. The Act reiterates the basic thrust
of the treaty that "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by
other than peaceful means" will be considered "a threat to the
peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern
to the United States.'7 The Act, however, goes further in expressly

stating that boycotts and embargoes would also constitute such a
threat, 72 and in affirmatively stating that "the United States will
make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to
maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."7 3
2.

Export-Import Bank

Taiwan credits represent the third largest concentration of financing by the Export-Import Bank of the United States. One of

68. Hearings on S. 245, supra note 62, at 188.
69. Goldwater v. Carter, 48 U.S.L.W. - (S. Ct. 1979). Six Justices did not
reach the merits of the case, four finding it nonjusticiable, one finding it not ripe
for judicial review, and one concurring in dismissal without specifying his
grounds.
70. Id. Pursuant to Article X of the treaty, one year's notice of termination is
required. The right of the President to terminate such a treaty unilaterally has
been the topic of continuing debate. Among those who claim that the President
does not have the right are Senator Goldwater, Abrogating Treaties,N.Y. Times,
Oct. 11, 1977, at p. 37, col. 1; Goldwater, Treaty Termination is a SharedPower,
65 A.B.A.J. 198, 202 (1979); Professors Reisman and McDougal of the Yale Law
School, Reisman and McDougal, Who Can Terminate Mutual Defense Treaties?,
The Nat'l Law J., May 21, 1979, at 19, col. 1; and J.T. Emerson, The Legislative
Role in Treaty Abrogation, 5 J. LEGIS. 46 (1978). Those who argue in favor of the
President's power to terminate the Treaty unilaterally include Senator Kennedy,
Kennedy, Normal Relations with China: Good Law, Good Policy, 65 A.B.A.J. 194,
195 (1979); and, predictably, Dep't of State Legal Advisor, H. Hansell, Memorandum for Secretary of State, President's Power to Give Notice of Termination of
U.S.-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty, reprinted in Hearings on S. 254, supra note
62 at 189.
71. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3301(b)(4) (Supp. 1 1979).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 3302(a). See also id. § 3301(b)(4).
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the first questions raised upon derecognition of Taiwan was the
future policy of the United States toward outstanding and future
loans to Taiwan customers. Over one billion dollars in credits and
guarantees are presently outstanding to borrowers in Taiwan. Eximbank has now made it clear that credits to private business
enterprises in Taiwan will continue substantially as in the past.
Credits to the ROC government or its commercial agencies such
as the Bank of China or Taiwan Power Company will require the
interposition of one or both of the American Institute and the
Taiwan Council.74
3.

Overseas Private Investment Corporation

Taiwan's position with the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, the government-sponsored corporation that insures the foreign investment of United States investors against expropiration,
currency blockage and other political risks,7 5 is explicitly improved
by the Act.7" OPIC's enabling legislation requires it to favor activities in countries with annual per capita income below $1,000 adjusted to 1975 value." The per capita income in Taiwan has for the
first time exceeded that figure,78 and it would in due course have
been removed from the preference list. The Act, however, specifies
that the $1,000 restriction will not apply to invesiment projects
commenced in Taiwan within three years from the8 date of the Act's
enactment." All other criteria remain the same. 1
4. Governmental Properties
Principles of international law suggest that property located in
the United States and owned by the Chinese state must be viewed
as subject to the control of the recognized government of China,
74. Address by W. Glick, General Counsel for Eximbank, Taiwan: Legal
Fallout of Derecognition, ALI-ABA Course of Study (June 1, 1979).
75. OPIC was established by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-175 § 231, 83 Stat. 809 (1969) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2191 (1976)).
76. 22 U.S.C. § 3304. Of the total U.S. investment in Taiwan of approximately $500 million, approximately $144 million was insured by OPIC. S. REP.
No. 96-97, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 22-23 reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 671-72.
77. 22 U.S.C.A. § 2191 (1979).
78. S. REP. No. 96-97, supra note 76 at 28, reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 677.

79. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3304(a) (Supp. 1 1979).
80. Id. § 3304(b).
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which is now the PRC. 1 Because of the tremendous growth in
external assets of the ROC's government since December 1949, the
State Department expressed the view that real estate owned by
China prior to that time (such as the embassy property in Washington) would become subject to control of the PRC, while property subsequently acquired 2 (apparently presumed to include all
personal property, such as bank accounts) would remain subject
to control of the Taiwan government. s No legal authority was cited
for this position, and the question was not addressed in the legislation proposed by the President.
Congress stopped at no such halfway measures in the Act. The
Act provides that recognition of the PRC shall not affect private
property rights of Taiwan.84 It has been suggested that the provision may be void because it contravenes international law, and it
may be that the PRC will test the validity of the provision. Whatever the particular merits of such a position with respect to the
consular property, there appears to be no serious basis for challenging the legislative solution of the Act with respect to monetary
deposits and other commercial properties.
5.

Trade Law Status

United States trade with foreign countries is subject to significant regulation under United States laws, which frequently define
restrictions and incentives in relation to "countries" or use similar
terms connoting a separately definable entity. Section 4 of the Act
continues the application of United States laws to Taiwan in the
same manner that such laws previously applied. The section expressly provides that whenever the laws of the United States relate
to for~ign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities, such terms include Taiwan, regardless of the absence of recognition and diplomatic relations. 5 The Act thus insures that Taiwan will not be treated as a province of a Communist country for
the purposes of legislative restrictions applicable to such countries.
Taiwan will remain eligible under such laws as the Arms Export
81.
82.
83.
Office
84.

See text accompanying note 7 supra.
Such property would include all personal property such as bank accounts.
Interview with Steven Orlins, attorney, Dep't of State, Legal Advisor's
(January 11, 1979).
22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(3)(B) (Supp. 1 1979).

85. Id. § 3303(a).
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Control Act of 1968,5 the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,8 the ExportImport Bank Act of 1945,8 the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,9 the
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961,11 and the
Trade Act of 1974.1' Included under the 1974 Trade Act are provisions for nondiscriminatory trade treatment and for the benefits
accorded lesser developed countries under the generalized system
of preferences. Exports from Taiwan to the United States will not
be combined with those from the PRC for purposes of orderly marketing agreement limits.
C.

Effects at Private Level

1.

Immigration and Visas

The immigration laws, like other laws of the United States, continue to apply to Taiwan and its nationals as previously.2 Hence,
there should be no difference in the criteria applied in the issuance
of visas, and in the manner in which the entry of Taiwanese nationals into the United States is administered. The removal of diplomatic and consular facilities from the island of Taiwan and the
substitution of the American Institute has resulted in some change
in the procedure for the issue of visas. The Institute is not authorized to issue visas for entry into the United States because the
American Institute is a private corporation and not an agency of
the United States government. Any person in Taiwan wishing to
apply for an entry visa into the United States may submit an
application for a visa to any United States diplomatic or consular
office, the nearest of which is in Hong Kong. Taiwanese nationals
applying for a visa may submit applications for visas to the American Institute in Taiwan for transmission to Hong Kong. Passports
and visas may still be received at the American Institute after their
processing. The Act provides that Taiwan9 3 shall be eligible for the
annual limitation of 20,000 immigrant visas authorized for any
single foreign state under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

22 U.S.C) § 2751-54 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq.
12 U.S.C. § 635-35i.
22 U.S.C. § 2151 et seq.
Id. § 2451-59.

91. Id. § 2101 et seq.
92. 22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(a) (Supp. 1 1979).

93. Id. § 3303(b)(6).
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1952.11 For the United States businessmen and tourists travelling
to Taiwan, the offices of the Taiwan Council will continue to provide visas.
2.

Resort to the Courts

The Act provides that the capacity of Taiwan to sue and be sued
in the courts of the United States shall not be affected in any way
by the absence of diplomatic relations or recognition. 5 The Act
then defines Taiwan to include, as the context may require, "the
islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores, the people on those islands,
corporations and other entities and associations created or organized under the laws applied on those islands, and the governing
authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities (including political subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities thereof)."9
3.

Conflicts Questions

The Act provides that whenever the application of the laws of
the United States depends upon the law applicable on Taiwan, the
ROC law shall be considered applicable." The United States thus
continues to recognize the legal system in effect on Taiwan, and
reference will be made to the laws of Taiwan whenever required by
choice of laws rules.
4.

Private Property

The Act preserves private property rights: the "absence of diplomatic relations and recognition with respect to Taiwan shall not
abrogate, infringe, modify, deny, or otherwise affect in any way
any rights or obligations (including but not limited to those involving contracts, debts, or property interests of any kind) under the
laws of the United States heretofore or hereafter acquired by or
with respect to Taiwan.""9
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

8 U.S.C. § 1152 (1976).
22 U.S.C.A. § 3303(b)(7) (Supp. 1 1979).
Id. § 3314.
Id. § 3303(b)(4).
Id. § 3303(b)(3)(A).
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CONCLUSION

Taiwan has rapidly become one of the pre-eminent capitalist
showplaces among countries of the developing third world. It is
also a major United States trade partner. The events devolving
from the Joint Communique of December 15, 1978, have been notable not only for facilitating the continuation of normal United
States-Taiwan relations without interruption, but also as a benchmark in application of United States recognition policies. The executive branch, with the cooperation of the legislative branch, has
succeeded in divorcing the diplomatic act of governmental recognition from its traditional non-diplomatic consequences. The ability
thus to utilize the Congress to establish the specific consequences
of recognition or de-recognition in a particular case should serve
to make recognition policy a more flexible diplomatic tool in the
future.

